The Bush Administrations Relation With Iraq Prior to Iraqs Invasion o

The Bush Administration's Relation With Iraq Prior to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait Prior to the August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait on the part of Iraq, the United States had questionable relations with Iraq dictator, Saddam Hussein, to say the least. In retrospect, which is inherently advantageous as a 20/20 perspective, questions remain unanswered as to whether or not the United States was too appeasing to Saddam Hussein in the years, months, and days leading up to that early August morning. There remains to this day lingering questions as to the role that the US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, played in conveying the Administration's message to the Iraqi leader. In addition, questions surrounding the Administrators official policy, the calculations (or miscalculations) on the part of the State Department and other agencies within the US government, the Administrations covert plan to aid an Italian bank in illegal loans to benefit Saddam's military and the advice that the US received from other Arab nations with respect to what US relations should be with Iraq in terms of any impending border dispute, constitute a limited context of the issues that faced the Administration as it tried to deal with the leader of the largest economy of the Persian Gulf region. The Bush Administration's relations with Iraq prior to its invasion of Kuwait were clouded in a context of misperception by both states and further complicated by a lack of credibility on the part of key actors of both sides as well. This tragic sequence of events that led to the invasion of Kuwait cannot solely be attributed to personality traits or even actions by key individuals within the Administration. In retrospect, it is much more complex than that. However, the actions and public and private statements on the part of key personnel on both sides most likely contributed to the eventual invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. Since, a brief, yet modest account of the history of the events leading up to the invasion and the invasion in itself along with the regional and global actors has been offered in section A, section B will be an analysis of the role of misperception and questions of credibility with respect to key actors on both sides of the issue, from State Department officials to Saddam Hussein himself. While touching on the importance and significance of o... ..., 3/20/91 6 Glaspie, April, Opening Remarks, Hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3/20/91 7 Iraqi Government, Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting with US Envoy, "The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.19 8 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault," The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1 9 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault," The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1 10 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault," The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1 11 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault," The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A18 12 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault," The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A18 14 Friedman, Thomas, "US Explains View of Envoy to Iraq," The New York Times, 3/22/31, p.A9, col. 1 15 Sciolino, Elaine, "Envoy's Testimony on Iraq is Assailed," The New York Times, 7/13/91, p.A1, col.1 16 Sciolino, Elaine, "Envoy's Testimony on Iraq is Assailed," The New York Times, 7/13/91, p.A4, col.1 17 McAllister, J.F.O., "The Lessons of Iraq," Time, 11/2/92, pp.57-59 The Bush Administration's Relation With Iraq Prior to Iraq's Invasion o The Bush Administration's Relation With Iraq Prior to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait Prior to the August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait on the part of Iraq, the United States had questionable relations with Iraq dictator, Saddam Hussein, to say the least. In retrospect, which is inherently advantageous as a 20/20 perspective, questions remain unanswered as to whether or not the United States was too appeasing to Saddam Hussein in the years, months, and days leading up to that early August morning. There remains to this day lingering questions as to the role that the US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, played in conveying the Administration's message to the Iraqi leader. In addition, questions surrounding the Administrators official policy, the calculations (or miscalculations) on the part of the State Department and other agencies within the US government, the Administrations covert plan to aid an Italian bank in illegal loans to benefit Saddam's military and the advice that the US received from other Arab nations with respect to what US relations should be with Iraq in terms of any impending border dispute, constitute a limited context of the issues that faced the Administration as it tried to deal with the leader of the largest economy of the Persian Gulf region. The Bush Administration's relations with Iraq prior to its invasion of Kuwait were clouded in a context of misperception by both states and further complicated by a lack of credibility on the part of key actors of both sides as well. This tragic sequence of events that led to the invasion of Kuwait cannot solely be attributed to personality traits or even actions by key individuals within the Administration. In retrospect, it is much more complex than that. However, the actions and public and private statements on the part of key personnel on both sides most likely contributed to the eventual invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. Since, a brief, yet modest account of the history of the events leading up to the invasion and the invasion in itself along with the regional and global actors has been offered in section A, section B will be an analysis of the role of misperception and questions of credibility with respect to key actors on both sides of the issue, from State Department officials to Saddam Hussein himself. While touching on the importance and significance of o... ..., 3/20/91 6 Glaspie, April, Opening Remarks, Hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3/20/91 7 Iraqi Government, Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting with US Envoy, "The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.19 8 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault," The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1 9 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault," The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1 10 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault," The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1 11 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault," The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A18 12 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault," The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A18 14 Friedman, Thomas, "US Explains View of Envoy to Iraq," The New York Times, 3/22/31, p.A9, col. 1 15 Sciolino, Elaine, "Envoy's Testimony on Iraq is Assailed," The New York Times, 7/13/91, p.A1, col.1 16 Sciolino, Elaine, "Envoy's Testimony on Iraq is Assailed," The New York Times, 7/13/91, p.A4, col.1 17 McAllister, J.F.O., "The Lessons of Iraq," Time, 11/2/92, pp.57-59